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Abstract— In this paper early detection of distributed attacks
are discussed that are launched from multiple sites of the hybrid
& public cloud networks. A prototype of Cloud Distributed
Intrusion Detection System (CDIDS) is discussed with some basic
experiments. The summation of security alerts has been applied
which helps to detect distributed attacks while keeping the false
positive at the minimum. Using the summation of security alerts
mechanism the attacks that have slow iteration rate are detected
at an early stage. The objective of our work is to propose a
Security Management System (SMS) that can detect malicious
activities as early as possible and camouflaging of attacks under
the conditions when other security management systems become
unstable due to intense events of attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing provides Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS),
Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service
(SaaS). There exist multiple types of clouds such as commu-
nity, private, public and hybrid clouds. Community clouds are
formed by multiple organizations which are working for the
same objective. Private cloud is owned by one administrative
domain, this type of cloud network is used by organizations
who wants to have full control of the cloud resources. Private
cloud is not used by many users as the benefits are very
limited. Public cloud are the most common and easily available
place for user to use resources either free or pay as per usage.
Hybrid clouds are the combination of community or public
clouds. The member of these clouds can get benefits of both
the cloud networks. It provides the users a large range of
resources available to use. There exists many cloud service
provider and they are growing as the technology is becoming
mature. The most prominent are the Amazon Elastic Compute
Cloud (Amazon EC2) [1] or S3 [2], Google cloud services
[3], Eucalyptus [4], IBM smart cloud [5] and Opennebula [6].
One of the security concern in the cloud computing, is
the handling of the data that is going to be placed at the
service provider’s network. The data placed on the cloud can
be misused or compromised and the owner does not even
know about the incident. A security management systems
called Cloud Distributed Intrusion Detection (CDIDS) has
been proposed in this paper. CDIDS’s separate policies can be
applied on the data in the form of security rules. The security
rules generate alarms if the security policy is violated by the
cloud service provider, by the owner itself or by any of its staff
members. The proposed solution can also helps in resolving
issues of privacy in the cloud infrastructure. In this paper more
details of the security issues in cloud networks are discussed
with their proposed solution.
The remaining part of the paper consists of VI sections.
Section II is the related work, section III highlights the existing
problems, section IV presents the proposed solution, section
V consists of the experiments, and section VI concludes and
outlines the future development.
II. RELATED WORK
The most recent issues are discussed by Balduzzi et al. [7]
where they highlighted the security issues present in the public
virtual images. They performed vulnerability tests on 5000
virtual machine images available in four different data centers
of Amazon [1] and reported several security issues, some of
them are:
(i) The confidential files were deleted while preparing the
virtual machine image but these file are easily recoverable
such as password files, SSH private keys, PGP private
keys, etc.
(ii) Discovered instances of SSH, different services and Web.
(iii) History of files of VNC, MySql, DNS, WebApp, and
SQL.
Bugiel et al. [8] also highlighted the similar issues discussed
by Balduzzi et al. [7], but they performed experiments on
1255 Amazon images and the scope of their experiments
was limited in covering security issues. The main focus of
both the findings is to emphasis that there exist some serious
security threats in cloud computing infrastructures. Garfinkel
and Rosenblum [9] highlighted the use of third party virtual
images and their security issues. They also discussed other
security issues exist in user generated virtual images. Glott
et al. [10] highlighted the security issues that occurs when
the virtual images are shared within multiple users in cloud
infrastructure. They proposed some assessments to find out
the vulnerabilities present in the virtual image. Ristenpart
et al. [11] only presented the introduction of side channel
attacks in cloud computing networks. Bleikertz at al. [12] used
graph theory techniques to deploy virtual machine images in
AmazonEC2 infrastructure. The objective of their work is to
focus on the security issues that are present at the infrastructure
level which is a different approach as others focus more on
the virtual images security. Their propositions are based on
configuring network and setting the security policies properly.
III. DESIGN GOALS
In this section four types of problems are discussed namely;
early detection of attacks, scalability and fault-tolerance, an
intensive attack which last for very short period of timed, and
minimization of false positives.
(I) Early detection of Attacks: In large computing
infrastructures such as grids and clouds early detection of
attacks is very important. Due to the nature of these networks
where the network is shared by many users dispersed globally.
Those attacks that are detected with a slight delay can cause
very serious consequences for all the users. As we know that
users from different organization can have access to cloud
computing infrastructures. It is highly possible that some of
the users that use the cloud and its services are not very
secure within there network. It includes numerous factors
such as vulnerabilities present in their machines, lack of
anti-virus and firewalls in the network, no or poor security
policies are in place in their local network. These users are
the main source which can be exploited by attackers and
can be used as zombies. They can become the cause of
attack distribution to other secure users, which are part of
the organization that has spend a lot of money and resources
to make their network secure. One possible vulnerable area
which is discussed in the related work are the reused of the
virtual machines images that are shared among the users.
Although the users for highly important experiments does
not uses the virtual images of other users but there are
chances that the virtual images that are used by other users
does have some back-doors open in for form of root-kits.
These back-door are used by the attackers to collect sensitive
information of the other participating members of the network.
(II) Scalability and Fault-Tolerance: In large size computing
infrastructure scalability is a key factor because the size of
the networks always grows dynamically. This increase in
the size leads to condition where the Security Management
System (SMS) that manages the security of that network
becomes overloaded by huge number of security alerts.
Current SMSs struggle a lot under intensive attacks discussed
by Raheel et al. in [13] and [14]. Their experiments show
that the performance of the SMSs degrade after certain period
of time. As large networks are distributed to many locations
therefore the SMS is also distributed in order to monitor
every site of the network. Fault-Tolerance is mandatory when
any component of the SMS fails to works or targeted by
the attackers. If the replacement of that component is not
provided on time the SMS cannot not detect the attacks that are
in place at the premises of that local site of the cloud network.
(III) An intensive attack which last for very short period
of time: When attackers are distributed across different sites
of the network they use slow timed pace attacks. The reason
to use low iteration of the attempts is to hide the attacks
from the SMS. For example a brute force attack that has
a dictionary which contains thousands of passwords. If the
attacker uses it from one place by one instance, he needs
to keep trying at a high iteration rate to break the password
of the machine. There are high chances that due to the high
number of attempts the attacker is identified by the SMS.
If the attack uses slow iteration rate than it might take too
long to get success. Therefore the best approach is to divided
the dictionary of passwords in small chunks of multiple
files. The attacker uses multiple instances of the attacks and
uses these small dictionary of passwords simultaneously.
The attacker slows down the number of attempts from each
instance and get the same iteration rate if combined together.
This technique is very common and quite effective if the
SMS has some threshold defined to generate the attack alarm.
The attacker keep the iteration of the attempts below this
threshold value and gets success in its attacks.
(IV) Minimization of false positives: The events are collected
and analyzed in order to produce an alert. For generating an
attack alarm there are two possibilities. First; the SMSs mostly
use some threshold value before generating an attack alarm.
This threshold triggers an alarm if any specific alert reaches
a defined limit of iterations. Second; the SMS has some
defined security rules, On the basis of these rules, SMS decides
whether it is an attack or a normal activity. The wrong attack
alarm can be reduce if the common attack alerts are combined
at a specific time. This mechanism is effective in minimizing
the false positive rates and enhances the performance of the
SMSs.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
To address all the above mentioned problems a SMS called
Cloud Distributed Intrusion Detection System (CDIDS) has
been proposed. Only the overview of the CDIDS has been
discussed in this paper. Figure 1 is the internal view of
CDIDS. It shows that CDIDS is based on log collection
model. CDIDS collects logs from multiple collectors that
are distributed and placed across the cloud infrastructure.
Collectors are the modules that are programmed to receive logs
from computing elements present in the network. Similarly
computing elements are configured to send their logs to the
collectors. Several collectors are distributed across all the local
sites of the network. The number of collectors can be increased
or decreased depending upon the numbers of logs generated
in that local site. The collectors analyze the logs to detect
the attack incidents. If some incidents are found, they are
marked as alerts and forwarded to the log manager. The main
controller and the analyzer of the systems is the log manager
that holds the security alerts which come from different cloud
networks. The log manager formates the received local alerts
and correlate them to report whether it is really an attack
incident or not. It further analyzes all the local alerts received
to detect the distributed attacks lunched on multiple local
sites of the network. The detected attacks are formatted in a
standard formate that is defined in the CDIDS. All the detected
alerts with a specified formate of CDIDS are forwarded to
match with the general security rules that are written by the
security manager. In general security rules, if the security alerts
are matched with any of the defined rule. One alarm generates
containing all the necessary information about the attack, its
re-occurrence, the time it was started and the elapsed time.
At the final stage a further analysis of the attack is done to
calculate its intensity. Once all the parameters are marked it
is saved into the cloud service provider’s database for further
forensic analysis.
Figure 2 represents the overview of the cloud security
management system which composes of multiple public &
hybrid clouds. Each cloud consists of several Administrative
Domains (AD) which are further divided into many local sites.
It shows that how events are collected and correlated to detect
the attacks which can occur in different cloud networks. The
CDIDS helps to handle all the above mentioned problems.
It detects the attacks at a very early stage by summation of
security alerts globally. Summation of alerts can be done
securely by using Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC).
The SMC is first proposed by Andrew Chi in [15]. In an
SMC setting [16][17], a number of participants, each having a
piece of private data, wishes to compute the value of a public
function. A protocol is secure if the computation yields, to all
participants, no more information than their own inputs and
the final result. In the proposed approach, secure sum and
secure comparison protocols can be used to sum the number
of security alerts from individual administrative domains and
to determine if it exceeds a given threshold. The secure sum
and secure comparison protocols can be implemented using
the SEPIA framework [18] based on Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme. It even detects those attacks that lasts for very short
period of time. CDIDS has a scalable architecture and it
is fault-tolerant. In order to minimize the false positives
and accurately detect the attacks a distributed security alert
summation technique has been adopted. It helps in detecting
the attack by adding all the reported security alerts occurred
during the same period of time within all the member of the
cloud computing network. In CDIDS security alerts sharing
mechanism between intra cloud can be further improved using
privacy preserving data release techniques such as those based
on k-anonymity [22][23] and differential privacy [19][20] [21].
V. EXPERIMENTS FOR OPTIMIZING DETECTION OF
DISTRIBUTED ATTACKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING
NETWORKS
In this section three types of experiments are performed in
order to handle the problems discussed above. CDIDS which
Fig. 1. Cloud Distributed Intrusion Detection (CDIDS) Core Design
is proposed in this paper can adopt the techniques shown in
this section. Figures 3, 4 and 5 are the results achieved by
simulating the characteristics of the SMS in our testbed.
A. Smurf Attack detection
Smurf attack is a type of DoS attack in which the attacker
uses spoofed IP addresses in order to generate huge traffic at
the victim machine. In smurf attack one attacker or group of
attackers use large amount of ICMP packets to a specific or
broadcast IP addresses. In this attack scenario the group of
attackers launched the attack simultaneously on four Cloud
Network (CN). They spoofed their IP addresses which makes
it harder to detect early by the security management system.
Using the summation of the sites the attacks are detected
earlier. Multiple attackers use multiple commands of hping to
launch the attacks, which are as under,
Attacker1: hping3 -a spoofed IP address -i u1 -S
victim IP address
Attacker2: hping3 -a spoofed IP address -i u10 -S
victim IP address
Attacker3: hping3 -a spoofed IP address -i u100 -S
victim IP address
Attacker4: hping3 -a spoofed IP address -i u1000 -S
victim IP address
The parameter of the hping command are, ”-a” is used to
set any IP address, ”-i u” is the delay in transmitting another
packet in micro seconds and ”-S” is used to set the SYN TCP
flag.
Figure 3 shows the early detection of Smurf attack using
the security alerts summation mechanism. The received alerts
from the members of the cloud are further analyzed at each
CN to detect distributed attacks. Three thresholds are set
globally to detect the distributed attacks. The reason to set
these thresholds is to detect the attacks as early as possible
Fig. 2. General View of Intra-public Cloud Architecture
and to minimizing the false positives. The threshold values
are adjustable according to the size of the network and the
capacity to handle and store the security alerts globally.
The low threshold is set to 100000 number of security
alerts. The medium threshold is set to 250000 number of
alerts. The high threshold is set to 400000 number of alerts.
Using the low threshold the Smurf attack is detected on
CN 1,3&4 between 1 to 2 minutes. The medium threshold
detects the Sumurf attack on CN 3&4 is detectable between
3 to 4 minutes whereas on CN 2,3&4 the same attack is
detected in between 1 to 2 minutes. The high threshold
can only detect the summation of CN 2,3&4 at the fourth
minute. This experiment shows that early detection of
attacks explained in problem I can be improved by using
the summation of security alerts. It can also help the SMS
to minimize the false positives discussed in problem IV,
because the alarm of attack that has the iteration rate in
thousands of alerts proves that SMS has detected a real attack.
B. SYN Flooding Attack Detection
TCP protocol uses three-way handshake mechanism which
is vulnerable to SYN flood attacks. (i) Attacker sends ”SYN”
to victim. (ii) Victim sends ”SYN-ACK” back to the attacker.
(iii) Attacker does not sends ”ACK” and keeps sending ”SYN”
packet to the victim. The SYN flood attack is one kind of
DoS attack where high number of ”SYN” packets are send
by the attackers to the victim machine. The victim machine
allocates resources for each request sent by the attackers. The
victim machine sends back the ”SYN-ACK” to the source IP
of the attackers. The attackers use the spoofed IP addresses
which does not exists in the network. This results in no ”ACK”
response from the attackers. The attackers continue sending
high amount of ”SYN” packets to the victim machine and
victim waits for the ”ACK” request. After some time these
SYN packets sent by the attackers consume all the resources
of the victim machine and makes it unstable which results in
blocking all the requests coming from legitimate users. The
SYN attack can halt the entire network operations if uses the
broadcast address mixing with IP spoofing.
Figure 4 shows the SYN attack case, where the thresholds
are set to detect the instability in the security management
system. Four CNs are shown in the graph which are the
member of one cloud network. The curves show that after
passing of 2 minutes the CNs does not detect the attacks at
the same rate and continue to work at a constant rate. This
case occurs when the CN does not have much resources
to handle the intense attacks. Here the summation of alert
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Fig. 5. Multiple Attack Detection in seconds
mechanism is very useful because it detects the attacks even,
when the SMSs are struggling. At the low threshold level
the sum of CN 1&2 and the sum of CN 2&3 are detected
in between 1&2 minutes. The medium alert threshold level
detects the summation of alerts of the CN 1&3 and sum of
CN 1,2&3 in between 1&2 minutes. The high alert threshold
level only detects the summation of alerts of the CN 1,2&3
after 8 minutes. The hping command which is used to launch
the attack by the attackers is given below,
hping3 –syn –destport 80 -i u1000 Victim Machine
The parameter of the commands are, ”–syn” is to set the SYN
tcp flag, ”–desport 80” is to set the port number of the victim
and ”-i u1000” is to send the packet after the delay of 1000
micro seconds. IPtable rules to detect the malicious packets is,
iptables -A INPUT -d 0/0 -s0/0 -p tcp –tcp-
flags SYN,ACK,FIN,RST SYN -j LOG –log-prefix
”SYN ATTACK ”
This rule logs the packets that are coming from any source to
any destination using TCP protocol having any of the bit set
SYN,ACK,FIN,RST. It saves every attempt of this type with
the tag ”SYN ATTACK” in the system logs. This experiment
handles the instability issues discussed in problem II and
shows that the attacks are detected before the SMS becomes
unstable.
C. Distributed SYN and PoD Attack Detection in Seconds
In this attack multiple attackers use SYN and PoD
attacks together. Figure 5 shows the behavior of the SYN and
PoD attack. The commands that are used for these attacks are,
Attacker1: hping3 –syn –destport 80 -i u10 Victim Machine
Attacker2: hping3 –syn –destport 80 -i u100
Victim Machine
Attacker3: ping -s 64000 -i 0 IP
Attacker4: ping -s 65000 -i 0 IP
The parameter of the Ping command are, ”-s” defines the
packet size, ”-i” is the interval between two packets. Here
”0” means it is set to flood mode.
In this scenario the attackers increase and decrease their
attack intensity in order to camouflage their malicious
activities from the SMS. Therefore the attack detection is
more optimized by setting the thresholds in seconds. Multiple
attackers launches the SYN and PoD attack at the CN 1&2.
The objective of these attacks is to destabilize the security
management system and hide the real attacks such as Brute
Force. The graph shows that low threshold detects the
distributed PoD attack on CN 1&2 in between 6 to 7 seconds.
The medium threshold detects the distributed SYN attack
on CN 1&2 in between 3 to 7 seconds. This experiment
addresses problem III and shows that camouflaging the
malicious activities are now detectable.
VI. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
In this paper the internal architecture of CDIDS and its
core features are presented. The general view of CDIDS has
been explained that shows it is scalable and fault-tolerant.
Some experiments are conducted to show that how the early
detection of distributed attacks is possible. Few advantages
are highlighted such as minimization of false positives and
detection of attacks even when the SMS become unstable.
The summation of security alerts method helps in detection of
very powerful attacks which last for very short period of time.
Future modification in the design of the CDIDS needs to
be done, some of the propositions are:
(i) New boxes should be introduced at each service, that
means one box for infrastructure, one for platform and
one for software.
(ii) These boxes must be programmed to handle the specific
security issues occurred at each service level.
(iii) For every service there must be a separate analyzer which
communicates with the boxes located in its vicinity.
(iv) If needed the analyzers can also collaborate with each
other to detect the attacks that are launched using all the
three service levels.
(v) The analyzers at each service level must report to the
Main analyzer which will handle the security of the entire
cloud.
(vi) There may exist multiple dedicated boxes which are
allowed to share the security information with each other.
(vii) The manager of all the boxes will be the Cloud Box
that will present the global view of the security.
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